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INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY IN OHIO
AFTER Prem v. Cox
AT FIRST BLUSH, the January 5, 1983 Ohio Supreme Court decision in
Prem v. Cox, ' may lead opponents of the interspousal immunity doc-
trine to believe that the doctrine has been abrogated in Ohio. But such an analysis
might be too optimistic. Prem involved a wrongful death action brought by
the deceased wife's estate against her husband and the driver of a second vehicle.
The decedent's husband was driving the automobile in which the decedent was
a passenger when it collided with another vehicle. The husband's motion for
summary judgment based on the doctrine of interspousal immunity was granted
by the trial court and affirmed by the court of appeals. 2
In Prem the Ohio Supreme Court shifted from its prior position of total
support for the interspousal immunity doctrine, holding that "the doctrine of
interspousal immunity does not bar an action for wrongful death brought by
the estate of a deceased spouse against the surviving spouse." 3
The doctrine of interspousal immunity has its roots in the common law
perception of the legal identity of the husband and wife as one person, that
person being the husband." The wife had no personal or property rights. She
could not contract for herself nor sue or be sued without joining the husband.5
In addition to the right of possession and use of the wife's property, the hus-
band was entitled to collect money or obtain judgment in a suit related to the
property since such property, in effect, would be in his name.6 The only
exception to this single identity was under criminal law which regarded them
as separate individuals. 7
The unity of identity at common law extended beyond property rights into
tort law. The husband became liable for all his wife's torts, regardless of whether
they occurred prior to or after marriage or even if he was unaware of the tortious
act.' Because of this unity of legal identity, if a wife were to bring suit against
her husband, in essence, he would be suing himself. Thus, such actions were
'2 Ohio St. 3d 149, 443 N.E.2d 511 (1983).
21d.
3Id. at 152, 443 N.E.2d at 514.
'See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 122 (4th Ed. 1971); McCurdy, Torts Between Persons
in Domestic Relation, 43 HARv. L. REv. 1030 (1930) [hereinafter cited as McCurdy, Torts]; McCurdy
Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, 4 VILL. L. REV. 303 (1959) [hereinafter cited as McCurdy, Personal
Injury]; H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 9.1 (1968).
1H. CLARK, supra note 4, at § 9.1.
'W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at § 122.
'Id.
'Id. at 870.
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impossible under the common law.'
Changes in the legal status of women started around 1844 with the enact-
ment of statutes known as the Married Women's Acts.'" These statutes gave
women the right to own and control their own property, to sue and be sued
without joinder of the husband, and abolished a husband's legal responsibility
for his wife's torts, thereby destroying the common law unity of husband and
wife. "
The primary objective of these statutes was to separate the wife's property
from the husband's control.' 2 Consequently, a wife could bring suit in tort
for injury to personal property, against her husband, but the question remained
whether or not an action for a personal tort between spouses would be allowed.
This was precisely the issue addressed by the United States Supreme Court in
Thompson v. Thompson, I3 with the majority holding that a spouse could not
bring suit against spouse for personal injuries.'4 The Court narrowly interpreted
the District of Columbia's Married Woman's statute and stated that if the
legislature had wanted to allow suits for personal injuries between husband
and wife it would have clearly stated so in the statute.' 5 The Court found that
such a drastic departure from the common law should not be inferred but must
be explicitly stated by the legislature.' 6
Similarly, many state courts upheld the doctrine of interspousal immunity
in personal injury suits by narrowly construing the Married Women's statutes.
The Ohio Supreme Court in Damm v. Elyria Lodge No. 465, 1 stated that the
major reason for supporting the interspousal immunity doctrine was "that per-
sonal tort actions between husband and wife would disrupt and destroy the
peace and harmony of the home.""
Additional arguments in support of the doctrine included: 1) the spouse's
ability to seek a remedy under criminal and divorce laws' 9 ; 2) suits between
'McCurdy, Personal Injury, supra note 4, at 305.
"McCurdy, Torts, supra note 4, at 1036-37.
"See W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 861.
"McCurdy, Torts, supra note 4, at 1036.
3218 U.S. 611 (1910).
'Id. at 619.
'Id. at 618.
"Id. Justice Harlan stated in his dissenting opinion that the Married Women's Act of the District of Columbia
did permit personal injury suits between spouses. He declared such to be the will of the legislature and
by the Court's refusal to accept the plain meaning of the statute, it was making law rather than declaring
what the law was. Id. at 619 (Harland, J., dissenting).
" 158 Ohio St. 107, 107 N.E.2d 337 (1952). For a discussion pertaining to the public policy reasons behind
the doctrine of interspousal immunity see W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at § 122; H. Clark, supra note 4,
at § 9.1; Moore, The Case for Retention of Interspousal Tort Immunity, 7 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 943 (1980).
"Id. at 118, 107 N.E.2d at 343.
"Thompson, 218 U.S. at 619.
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spouses may encourage fraud and collusion2"; and, 3) the doctrine helps pre-
vent trivial suits from being brought into court.2 '
An indication of the diminishing acceptance of these arguments is evidenced
by the growing number of jurisdictions that have completely or partially
abrogated the doctrine of interspousal immunity. 2 This trend toward abolishing
the doctrine gained momentum in the middle 1900's.23 More and more courts
looked to Justice Harlan's dissent in Thompson as a guide in rejecting the doc-
trine and allowing suits for personal injury between spouses, whether based
on negligence or intentional tort.2 ' Legal writers have unanimously rejected
all arguments in support of the doctrine.25
As was true with the vast majority of jurisdictions, when Ohio passed its
Married Women's statute in 1877, nothing was specifically mentioned in regard
to personal torts.26 Like most jurisdictions at the time, Ohio continued to follow
the common law rule recognizing interspousal immunity for personal injury
suits between spouses. 27
The earliest Ohio Supreme Court case to deviate from the common law
"Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 245, 208 N.E.2d 533, 535 (1965).
'Thompson, 218 U.S. at 618.
22The following is a list of states which have totally or partially abolished interspousal immunity: Alabama:
Penton v. Penton, 223 Ala. 282, 135 So. 481 (1983); Alaska: Cramer v. Cramer, 379 P.2d 95 (Alaska
1963); Arkansas: Leach v. Leach, 227 Ark. 599, 300 S.W.2d 15 (1957); California: Klein v. Klein, 58
Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962); Colorado: Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P.2d 740
(1935); Connecticut: Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 13 A. 432 (1925); Idaho: Lorang v. Hayes,
69 Idaho 440, 209 P.2d 733 (1949); Indiana: Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 284 N.E.2d 794 (1972);
Iowa: Shook v. Crabb, 281 N.W.2d 616 (Iowa 1979); Kansas: Ebert v. Ebert, 232 Kan. 502, 656 P.2d
766 (1983); Kentucky: Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953); Maine: MacDonald v. MacDonald,
412 A.2d 71 (Me. 1980); Maryland: Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77 (1978); Massachusetts:
Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 351 N.E.2d 526 (1976); Michigan: Hosko v. Hosko, 385 Mich. 39, 187
N.W.2d 236 (1971); Minnesota: Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969); Nebraska:
Imig v. March, 203 Neb. 537, 279 N.W.2d 382 (1979); Nevada: Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d
1013 (1974); New Hampshire: Morin v. LeTourneau, 102 N.H. 309, 156 A.2d 131 (1959); New Jersey:
Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970); New Mexico: Maestras v. Overton, 87 N.M. 213,
513 P.2d 947 (1975); New York: State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance v. Westlake, 35 N.Y.2d 587, 324
N.E.2d 137, 364 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1974); North Carolina: Roberts v. Roberts, 185 N.C. 566, 118 S.E. 9
(1923); North Dakota: Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 62 N.D. 191, 42 N.W. 526 (1932); Oklahoma Courtney
v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1938); Oregon: Apitz v. Dames, 205 Or. 242, 287 P.2d 585
(1955); Pennsylvania: Hack v. Hack, 495 Pa. 300, 433 A.2d 859 (1981); Rhode Island: Digby v. Digby,
120 R.I. 299, 388 A.2d 1 (1978); South Carolina: Pardue v. Pardue, 167 S.C. 129, 166 S.E. 101 (1932);
South Dakota: Scotvold v. Scotvold, 68 S. D. 53, 298 N.W. 266 (1941); Texas: Bounds v. Caudle, 560
S.W. 2d 925 (Tex. 1978); Vermont: Richard v. Richard, 131 Vt. 98, 300 A.2d 637 (1973); Virginia: Surrat
v. Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 1983 S.E.2d 200 (1971); Washington: Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183,
500 P.2d 771 (1972); West Virginia: Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 244 S.E.2d 338 (W.Va. 1978); Wisconsin:
Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N.W. 475 (1926).
"See Note, Law of Interspousal Immunity in Ohio, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 115, 116, n.14 (1979).
"W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at § 122.
"Id. See also Moore, supra note 4, at 980 (in support of the doctrine); Comment 8 N. Ky. L. REV. 577
(1981); H. CLARK, supra note 4, at 253.
"OOHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.09 (Baldwin 1982) provides: "A married woman shall sue and be sued
as if she were unmarried, and her husband be joined with her only when the cause of action be in favor
of or against both."
"See State v. Phillips, 85 Ohio St. 317, 97 N.E. 976 (1912).
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rule was Damm v. Elyria Lodge No. 465 where a woman brought a negligence
action against an unincorporated association of which her husband was a
member.2" The issue was whether a wife could recover for a tort commitment
by her husband. 29 The court turned to the Ohio Constitution, article I, section
16 and concluded that "a married woman would have a right 'in due course
of law' to maintain an action for her injuries against any tort-feasor. "30 Justice
Matthias explored the "modern tendency" of the courts in permitting personal
injury suits between spouses3' and specifically referred to Justice Harlan's dissent
in Thompson.32
The syllabus3 3 in Damm specified that the common law doctrine of the
legal identity of husband and wife has been abolished and that the wife of a
member of an unincorporated association may bring suit for personal injury
against that association. 3 The difference between the court's precise holding
in the Damm syllabus and the extensive discussion in the opinion on a wife's
right to bring a personal tort action against her husband allowed the Ohio
Supreme Court to revert back into the old common law reasoning in Lyons
v. Lyons. In Lyons, a woman brought suit for personal injuries resulting from
the negligent operation of a vehicle by her husband. 36 The court of appeals
cited Damm as the controlling opinion and held for the wife. The Ohio Supreme
Court reversed and Justice O'Neill, in his opinion for the majority, stated that
the issue in Damm focused narrowly on whether a wife could sue an unincor-
porated association of which her husband was a member. 37 He argued that
the holding of the syllabus in Damm did not determine the issue of interspousal
immunity. He distinguished Damm on the basis that there was no danger of
marital disharmony in that case since the husband did not control the defense.38
By distinguishing the Damm case, the court in Lyons was able to articulate
its own reasoning and conclusion regarding the status of interspousal immunity
in Ohio. It held that a spouse could not bring an action for personal injuries
resulting from the negligence of the other spouse when the two were living
together as husband and wife at the time of the alleged injury. 39
2"158 Ohio St. at 107, 107 N.E.2d at 338.
2"Id. at 133, 107 N.E.2d at 341.
0Id. at 116, 107 N.E.2d at 342.
"Id. at 118, 107 N.E.2d at 343.
'2Id. at 120, 107 N.E.2d at 344.
"See Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d at 246, 208 N.E.2d at 534 where the Ohio Supreme Court stated
that the syllabus is the law in Ohio.
1"158 Ohio St. at 107; 107 N.E.2d at 338.
'2 Ohio St. 2d at 243, 208 N.E.2d at 533.
36Id.
"Id. at 246, 208 N.E.2d at 536.
"Id. at 245, 208 N.E.2d at 536.
"Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d at 243, 208 N.E.2d at 543. The court reasoned that the public policy of Ohio was
to promote marital harmony and suits between spouses would place a burden on the marriage that might
divide the home due to the adversarial nature of law suits. The court concluded the opinion by placing
the burden of changing public policy on the general assembly. Id. at 247, 208 N.E.2d at 545.
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Thirteen years later in Varholla v. Varhola,40 the Ohio Supreme Court
again faced the issue presented in Lyons, and once again declared interspousal
immunity to be a valid doctrine in Ohio. The dissent written by Justice William
B. Brown, however, was somewhat reminiscent of Justice Harlan's dissent in
Thompson."
Justice Brown attacked each of the majority's arguments for retaining the
doctrine. First he reasoned that since interspousal immunity originated in com-
mon law as a judicially created doctrine, it could be judicially abolished. 2
Second, he argued that there were many safeguards against fraudulent claims
built into the judicial process and that it was unlikely that, out of love, a wife
would be more likely to bring a false suit against her husband.4 3 The majority's
claim for promoting marital harmony via interspousal immunity is a non sequitur
according to Justice Brown. "The harmonious marriage will not be hurt by
allowing one spouse to benefit from the insurance coverage of the other." ' 4
Justice Brown concluded his argument finding interspousal immunity unconstitu-
tional and a denial of equal protection and due process to both spouses. He
relied on the court's prior ruling that Ohio's guest statute was unconstitutional. 5
The majority distinguished the two situations, finding that the different treat-
ment between spouses and non-spouses had a reasonable relationship to a
legitimate state interest, namely fostering marital harmony and preventing fraud
and collusion."6
At the time the Varholla decision was handed down, the majority of
jurisdictions had partially or totally abolished the interspousal immunity
doctrine.47 In 1978, Ohio was in the minority with only one justice advocating
abolishing the doctrine.
In Bonkowsky v. Bonkowsky, 8 the Ohio Supreme Court found itself faced
once again with a negligence action by a wife against her husband for injuries
sustained in an accident involving a vehicle driven by the husband in which
she was a passenger. 9 Once again the court stuck to its support of the inter-
"*56 Ohio St. 2d 269, 383 N.E.2d 888 (1978).
"id. at 271, 383 N.E.2d at 890 (Brown, J., dissenting).
241d. at 272, 383 N.E.2d at 890 (Brown, J., dissenting).
"3Id.
"Id. at 273, 383 N.E.2d at 891.
"4Id. at 271, 383 N.E.2d at 891.
"Id. at 270, 383 N.E.2d at 889. Within days of the Varholla decision, the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga
County decided Kobe v. Kobe, 61 Ohio App. 2d 67, 399 N.E.2d 124 (1974). In Kobe, a woman had sued
her former husband for permanent the injuries intentional inflicted by him during their marriage. The
court distinguished this case from Lyons in that the parties were divorced when the suit was filed so that
marital harmony had been irrevocably lost. Id. at 70, 399 N.E.2d at 126. The court was very careful to
limit the holding to the facts, and, therefore, made no comment on the status of interspousal immunity
in Ohio. Id. at 71, 399 N.E.2d at 126-27.
"See cases cited supra note 24. See also Casey, The Trend of Interspousal and Parental Immunity-Cakewalk
Liability, 45 INS. COUNS. J. 321 (1978).
"69 Ohio St. 2d 152, 431 N.E.2d 998, cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1135 (1982).
"Id. at 154, 431 N.E.2d at 99.
Spring, 1984]
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spousal immunity doctrine. This time, however, three justices dissented with
Justice William B. Brown delivering the highly critical dissenting opinion. 0
Less than a year later, the issue of interspousal immunity was again in
the Ohio Supreme Court but this time in a wrongful death action. The facts
in Prem v. Cox were similar in many ways with Lyons, Varholla and
Bonkowsky. The difference in Prem that discourages comparison among the
four cases is that in Prem there was no spouse bringing suit against spouse,
but rather, the deceased spouse's estate brought a wrongful death action on
behalf of the estate.
The issue facing the court in Prem was whether the doctrine of interspousal
immunity applies in a wrongful death action under Ohio Revised Code Sec-
tion 2125.01.51 The court held that it did not.52 The rationale used in reaching
the holding differed among the members of the majority. Chief Justice
Celebrezze wrote the court's opinion on the basis that wrongful death is a com-
pletely new and separate cause of action from that which the injured person
may have had.53 From such reasoning it follows that, regardless of whether
a wife could have brought a negligence action against her husband, the action
on behalf of her estate was "maintained under separate and independent
rights.""
The specific portion of Ohio Revised Code Section 2125.01 at issue in Prem
reads: "When the death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default
which would have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover
damages if death had not ensued . . . ."" In her dissenting opinion, Justice
Krupansky looked to the plain meaning of the statute and reasoned that the
estate of the deceased may maintain a wrongful death action only if the deceased
could have recovered damages if death had not occurred." Therefore, since
according to Bonkowsky, Varholla and Lyons interspousal immunity bars one
spouse from suing the other for personal injuries, the estate likewise could not
bring a wrongful death action.57
"Id. at 155, 431 N.E.2d at 1000 (Brown, J., dissenting).
1OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2125.09 (Baldwin 1982) which states:
When the death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default which would have entitled
the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages if death had not ensued, the corporation
which or the person who woulid have been liable if death had not ensued, or the administrator
or executor of the estate of such person, as such administrator or executor, shall be liable to an
action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured and although the death was
caused under circumstances which make it murder in the first or second degree, or manslaughter.
"Prem, 2 Ohio St. 3d at 152, 443 N.E.2d at 514. It is interesting to note that Chief Justice Celebrezze
voted with the majority in Bonkowsky, which included Justices Locher, Holmes and Krupansky. By voting
with the majority in Prem, which included Justices W. Brown, Sweeney and C. Brown, Chief Justice
Celebrezze left the remaining Bonkowsky majority in the minority.
"See Klema v. St. Elizabeth's Hospital of Youngstown, 170 Ohio St. 519, 166 N.E.2d 765 (1960); and
Karr v. Sixt, 146 Ohio St. 527, 67 N.E.2d 331 (1946).
"See Gorman v. Columbus & Southern Ohio Electric, 144 Ohio St. 593, 60 N.E.2d 700 (1945).
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.01 (Baldwin 1978).
"Prem, 2 Ohio St. 3d at 153, 443 N.E.2d at 515 (Krupansky, J., dissenting).
57Id.
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The focus of the Chief Justice's opinion of the court and Justice
Krupansky's dissenting opinion centers on the interpretation of the language
in Ohio Revised Code Section 2125.01. The Chief Justice does not abrogate
the doctrine nor even criticize its application in interspousal personal injury
suits. His only reason for refusing to apply it in this case is that he sees the
wrongful death action as separate and distinct from any action which the deceas-
ed might have brought had she lived. Her disabilities as party to a suit do not
adhere to the wrongful death action." Unlike the Chief Justice, the remaining
three members of the majority base their decisions on the belief that the doc-
trine of interspousal immunity should be abolished in every instance.9
What does the Prem decision mean for interspousal immunity in Ohio?
As far as setting a new precedent, Prem has a very narrow application. The
case, however, may prove to be valuable to opponents of the court's old way
of thinking. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Chief Justice clearly stated
that he perceived interspousal immunity as still valid in "cases supported by
the traditional justifications, 60 those being marital harmony and prevention
of fraud and collusion.6 1
The syllabus of the case abolishes the doctrine only in an action for
wrongful death. The Chief Justice did not reverse the holdings in Lyons,
Varholla or Bonkowsky. His rejection of interspousal immunity in Prem was
based solely on a definition of wrongful death as an action distinct from any
right of action which the decedent might have had. 6 He does not concur with
the other majority members who support the total abolishment of the doc-
trine. The narrow holding of the case applies only to that small portion of tort
cases involving wrongful death actions between spouses.
While the increasing majority of jurisdictions abolishing interspousal
immunity is impressive, that alone is not reason enough for Ohio to follow
suit. It is enough, however, to analyze the public policy reasons used by the
Ohio Supreme Court in its supporting arguments for the doctrine and to ex-
pose their obvious weaknesses. When the old common law justification for
creation of the doctrine, namely unity of husband and wife, was no longer
viable, the courts turned to the public policy arguments. With thos arguments
continually losing they persuasiveness they may once had had, there seems no
reason to continue the application of an antiquated doctrine. Even the argu-
ment for stare decisis is not persuasive in light of the overwhelming justifica-
"'Id. at 151, 443 N.E.2d at 513.
"Id. at 152-53, 443 N.E.2d at 514-15. Justices concur in the syllabus and judgment only. Id.
9Id. at 151, 443 N.E.2d at 513.
"According to legal writers, and the majority of jurisdictions, there are no valid justifications for retaining
interspousal immunity. See supra note 17.
"Prem, 2 Ohio St. 3d at 150, 443 N.E.2d at 513.
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tion for abolishing interspousal immunity. 3 By enforcing the doctrine, Ohio
is shutting out an entire class of victims from the just compensation that tort
law provides to them. Since Prem v. Cox is only a slight departure from the
total acceptance of the interspousal immunity doctrine in Ohio, it is too early
to predict if it signifies a movement toward abolishing the doctrine.
JEAN M. FLOASIN
"For material analyzing the validity of the public policies behind the doctrine see supra notes 4, 16 and
17. See also Note, The Law of Interspousal Immunity in Ohio, 28 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 115 (1979). It is
significant that since Prem, the members of the Ohio Supreme Court have changed. Justice Krupansky,
a strong supporter of the doctrine, has been replaced by Justice James P. Celebrezze. Whether or not
the new Justice will be supportive of the doctrine is yet to be seen.
[Vol. 17:4
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